The breakdown: The company did well overseas, where revenue jumped 17.8 percent after factoring out currency effects, and poorly in the U.S., where sales dropped by 7.4 percent. Digital, which grew by 11.5 percent (excluding FOREX), now makes up 21.4 percent of Warner’s (WMG) revenue.

Operating income dropped by 18 percent, to $54 million, but all of that decline stems from the severance charges. Factor those out and operating income would be up slightly to $68 million.

For years, the music industry has watched music sales drop while music publishing–money generated by the underlying compositions of songs–has increased. But this time around that’s not the case. Warner says recorded music sales were up 3.7 percent (net of currency changes) and that music publishing revenue was up 11.7 percent.

But all of the publishing increase stems from a one-time gain of $25 million “from an agreement reached by the U.S. recorded music and music publishing industries, which will result in the payment of mechanical royalties accrued in prior years by record companies.”

No purchase price disclosed, but I’m fairly confident this was in the sub-$50 million category. Teracent had been looking to raise something like $5 million earlier this year and had previously raised around $6 million, much of it from New Enterprise Associates.

I’m told the company was doing something under $2 million a year in revenue, and when I talked to CEO Vikas Jha in September, he told me that the three-and-a-half-year-old company is profitable.

One immediate beneficiary of the deal: Rival ad optimizer Tumri, which does very similar work.

The company’s revenue climbed 7.4 percent in the 12 months ending March 31, the company disclosed (via PaidContent).

The rise is due to increases in both the sale of recorded music and publishing revenue; increases in the former are particularly rare these days. And these numbers ought to bump again in the coming year given that they’ll include dollars/pounds generated by the re-release of the Beatles albums.

Alas, since EMI owner Terra Firma is deep in the midst of negotiations with Citigroup (C), which lent it billions to buy the company, it’s not handing out any other details about the company’s performance, so hard to tell what’s really going on there.

Still, we do know that music has been in decline for a decade, and EMI’s bump up is the first, no matter how modest, in many moons (click on table below to enlarge).

For those who haven’t been following along, here’s what we know about Vevo:

• It will be powered by Google’s (GOOG) YouTube, which will share ad revenue with the joint venture.
• It is being run by Rio Caraeff, Universal’s veteran digital guy.
• In addition to its equity partnership, its distribution strategy is modeled after Hulu: Sony and Universal videos will appear exclusively on the site and/or YouTube, but the site plans on licensing its stream to other outlets, as Hulu does with portals like MySpace and Comcast’s (CMCSA) Fancast. One obvious place to license the stuff: Hulu itself.
• Neither EMI nor Warner Music Group (WMG), which has created its own Vevo-like channel with YouTube, is participating in the venture, but they could.

Little by little, AOL is offering investors more and more details about what the company will look like after it spins off from Time Warner (TWX).

The problem: The more AOL discloses, the less attractive the company looks.

The most recent nuggets come from a preliminary prospectus Time Warner filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission yesterday. Some, but not all, of this has broken out in previous filings or earnings announcements. In any case, it helps to see it all in one place.

The big picture: AOL’s subscription service, which accounts for the “vast majority” of the company’s operating income, is withering away. But advertising revenue, which was supposed to replace that money, has been declining for nearly two years (see tables below; click to enlarge):

And here’s a closer look at the ad business and its recent performance:

The good news for AOL is that some of this is the result of self-inflicted wounds, and it’s possible to heal some of them. The company’s previous regime seemed to go out of its way to mismanage and dismantle the sales force, for example, and if new CEO Tim Armstrong can rebuild that team, he can make a bit of headway.

The flip side is that some of AOL’s woes may be well beyond Armstrong’s control. Money from a Google (GOOG) search deal, which provided a third of AOL’s $2.1 billion in ad revenue last year–and had been increasing up until this year–is now dropping off, too.

Google dollars fell by $42 million in the most recent quarter, representing more than half the $75 million drop in ad dollars from its AOL Media unit. And Google income fell by $90 million in the last nine months, representing about 40 percent of $197 million decline in that period.

AOL says some of the Google decline stems from its declining subscriber base, which brought down search query volume. The rest is due to lower revenue per search query–that is, Google has changed its algorithm in way that ends up punishing AOL. But Armstrong can’t do a whole lot about either of these variables.

He can try extracting more money from Google, whose search deal expires at the end of next year, or from Microsoft (MSFT), which is trying to gain share any way it can.

Earlier this year, Armstrong turned down a new deal from Google and now says he’ll deal with search after he gets other things in place. But the longer he waits, the less leverage he may have.

AOL shareholders will be paying Armstrong well to figure this out, though. His three-year deal pays him a base of $1 million a year, plus annual cash bonuses of up to $4 million. In addition, he’s getting $20 million worth of stock grants to make up for Google shares he left on the table when he resigned from his old employer. And he’ll get stock options worth as much as 1.5 percent of the company once the spinoff is complete.

That said, AOL will also be paying former AOL CEO Randy Falco, who got tossed out in March. Falco will continue to pull down a $1 million salary through 2010–and he’ll get $7.5 million in bonuses through then as well. Former AOL COO Ron Grant, meanwhile, will earn $750,000 a year, plus another $3.3 million in bonuses.

(Thanks to a sharp-eyed reader–who has good reason to be sharp-eyed about this stuff–for noting that the freeze only affects management and not the rank and file.)

The takeaway: The site is losing traffic and money and no longer expects to get all of the $900 million it once counted on from a Google search deal. Also, the company really doesn’t know what to expect of the property going forward, except that it’s a work in progress.

So: Either digital media boss Jon Miller, MySpace CEO Owen Van Natta and the rest of the new team brought in this year to fix the site have an impossible task or expectations are now so low that even modest improvement will look like a huge victory.

Details from the earnings call, which I covered live this afternoon:

• Revenue was down 26 percent at Miller’s Digital Media Group (MySpace and a handful of other sites).
• That’s in part because conventional ad revenue is down and in part because search ad revenue is down.
• But isn’t Google (GOOG) supposed to be paying $900 million over three years in a search deal? Yes, but only if News Corp. (NWS) hits certain traffic/query guarantees, which isn’t happening anymore, says Murdoch.
• How much is MySpace going to miss by? This question occasions much confusion on the call. “I don’t know. But it will be a real figure,” Murdoch says. Then he throws out the number $300 million. His lieutenants suggest that it’s closer to 10 percent, or $90 million. I’ve since checked with News Corp. PR, which says the figure is “in the 100 [million] zone for the year.”
• So what’s the plan to fix all of this? “It’s a work in progress,” News Corp. officials say over and over during the call. Chase Carey, Murdoch’s new number two, uses the phrase at least three times in one answer.
• Any other color on overhaul plans? Nothing you haven’t heard before: The company is trying to become an entertainment portal instead of a social network. Carey: “We’re not trying to beat Facebook. We’re not trying to beat Twitter.”

(Disclosure: News Corp. owns Dow Jones, which owns this Web site).

That won’t help employees at Time Warner’s Time Inc. publishing unit: The company confirmed that it will make big cuts this quarter and spend up to $100 million on restructuring charges. This is different from the $100 million in cuts that had been previously reported, but it will still mean hundreds of layoffs at the publisher.

Time Warner also boosted its guidance for the remainder of the year and confirmed once again that it wants to spin off AOL before the end of the year. As well it should: The company said it has already spent a staggering $24 million on the spinoff so far this year, which includes $9 million in “pretax direct transaction costs (e.g., legal and professional fees).” It has spent another $83 million in restructuring charges at that unit in 2009.

As usual, Time Warner said ad sales have been lousy, but that its cable networks and film divisions had done okay. The breakdown:

• Cable networks: Revenue up five percent, because subscriber fees were up nine percent. Ad revenue was down one percent.
• Warner Bros. movie studio: Revenue down four percent, because of slumping DVD sales.
• Time Inc.: Revenue down 18 percent; advertising down 22 percent. Adjusted operating income down 42 percent. Hence the coming cuts.
• AOL: Revenue down 23 percent. Subscription revenue, which will continue to shrink, was down another 29 percent, and ad revenue, which is supposed to improve one day, was down 18 percent.

Viacom (VIA) says Q3 ad sales dropped four percent in the U.S., which is two points better than Q2. Companywide, revenue dropped three percent to $3.3 billion, which is what Wall Street expected, but the company slashed enough costs to produce an earnings surprise: After adjusting for one-time charges, Viacom posted earnings of 69 cents a share, well above the 57-cent consensus.

The company’s overall results do a nice job of illustrating why media companies and investors are so enamored of cable TV these days: Even though ads are slumping, the company was able to wring more out of cable system providers (and their subscribers), which more or less kept overall cable revenue flat.

Viacom’s movie business is much less meaningful than its TV operations, but in this case, it underperformed enough to drag the rest of the business down. Viacom blames a six percent drop on crummy DVD sales, which it says suffered compared with strong results a year ago.

But every studio in Hollywood is grappling with crummy DVD sales: The only real question is whether that’s a function of the economy or something larger.

I’ll  listen in on the call (8:30 am ET) and report back if there’s anything else worth noting.

UPDATE: CEO Philippe Dauman mentions the new “Sponge Bob Tickler” for the Apple (AAPL) iPhone app, which I believe means that at least one Viacom employee has won a private bet. Waiting to hear more about Q4 guidance.

The core question: Are Dauman and other Viacom execs mildly optimistic about recovery because of an easy comparison with a year ago or because ads are really coming back? A little of both, Dauman says: “Right now the tone is feeling better, but we have to be cautious.”

The publisher said newspaper revenue dropped 20 percent in the third quarter, and print ads dropped by 28 percent; both of these numbers are worse than Q2, which saw revenue drop by 14 percent and print ads by 20 percent.

No relief from Web ads, either: Internet revenue dropped 18 percent, a decline from the nine percent drop in Q2. And online display ads, which had been more or less flat for the last few quarters, fell off a cliff, dropping 14 percent.

Don’t be duped by headlines reporting a drop in the newspaper division’s losses, by the way. That’s due to one-time accounting charges the previous year. If you look at operating revenue and expenses via a less formal, but more practical, lens, the results are very unpleasant: Losses increased by 55 percent (see summary below; click to enlarge).

Want more bad news? Okay: The company’s magazine group says revenue dropped 33 percent, driven by a staggering 48 percent drop in ad sales at Newsweek.

If you’re at, say, Time Warner’s (TWX) Time Inc. and want to whistle past the graveyard, you can try blaming the drop on the title’s unsuccessful overhaul. But I find it hard to believe that Newsweek’s woes don’t reflect a larger magazine malaise. We’ll see next week.

The good news, as always: The big difference between the Post and many other publishers is that its parent company doesn’t depend on print media. The company’ core education business, which is what has sustained it for many years, continues to do well.

The latest unpleasant news comes from magazine heavyweight Meredith (MDP), which does its best to explain that things aren’t that bad: Two of the publisher’s big titles–Better Homes and Gardens and Family Circle–saw ad revenue grow in the last quarter, and the company says its magazine unit notched its “third consecutive quarter of advertising performance improvement.”

That sounds good, right? Except that magazine ad revenue still dropped five percent compared with the same quarter a year–and last year’s quarter was a terrible one in which ads dropped by 18 percent.

More data points to watch for in the next few days: The Washington Post (WPO), which reports tomorrow, and Time Warner (TWX), due up next week.

The company’s organic growth–sales after netting out acquisitions and currency fluctuations–dropped 14.2 percent, just barely better than the 14.5 percent it posted the previous quarter.

That is “less sequential progress in the quarter than we hope to see,” CEO Michael Roth deadpanned. On the plus side, his agencies are having nice chats:

However, it’s fair to say that the tone of our conversations with clients concerning the economy is improving. However, we’ve not seen this yet converted to consistent commitments to new or existing projects. Therefore, it looks as if the pace of the recovery will be gradual and that significantly improving organic revenue performance for the whole of 2009 compared to the first nine months performance will be challenging.

In the end, Roth gave more or less the same report that we’ve seen most other places that aren’t in the search ad business dominated by Google (GOOG): He argued that “the worst is over,” but he thinks any significant improvement won’t show up until 2010.

Alas, that kind of muted hopefulness isn’t nearly enough to save any jobs during this fall’s media layoff season, which kicked off this week as my former employers at Forbes took an ax–yet again–to that company’s payroll. On the schedule: Cuts at the New York Times (NYT), Time Warner’s (TWX) Time Inc. and at Bloomberg’s newly acquired BusinessWeek.

The short version is that unlike its broadcast peers, CBS (CBS) has been reluctant to make many of its shows available on the Web because it worries that doing so cuts into its core TV business.

So while GE’s (GE) NBC Universal and News Corp.’s (NWS) Fox put Hulu together, CBS stayed away. And when Disney (DIS) decided to join the joint venture earlier this year, CBS executives argued strenuously against the deal. Instead, CBS has been content to use the Web as a promotional tool for TV via outlets like Google’s (GOOG) YouTube.

The longer version is below, via the transcript of a brief chat I had with Smith this afternoon to discuss his plans and the network’s. This is stuff he’s talked about before–to reporters, in industry forums, and even via emails he wishes he hadn’t written–but I’m running it at length here.

Because 1) I think Smith does a good job of explaining the push-and-pull of Web viewership vs. Web economics that everyone in big media is grappling with, and 2) I want people to see just how difficult it is to keep up when Smith talks. He can get out a lot of words in a relatively short time.

I also had a quick chat with CBS CEO Les Moonves, who made many of the points Smith did, but with less verbiage: I’ll get you that transcript shortly, too.

Peter Kafka: Since you’re going to be advising CBS’s Web video strategy, why don’t you lay out, for the record, where things stand?

Quincy Smith:

We recognize that the Web is two things. It’s both a new medium…and there my example has always been, look at fantasy football: When you’re nice enough to watch the Jets just pound the snot out of the Raiders on Sunday, on a CBS channel…on fantasy football on CBSSports.com, you start on the Tuesday before and end the Wednesday after.

And what are you doing? You’re personalizing it, you’re becoming more of a fan of the game [Smith goes on to praise CBSSports.com's feature set]. All of those things are additive, so when Sunday comes in, you’re actually more of a fan, and you’ve even more convinced you’re going to watch that broadcast show.

Now, I realize that sports is reasonably bulletproof, and a good case study to begin with versus some of the other programming, but the fact is, the Web is a new medium. So what do I also mean? Tech reviews on CNET, Money Watch being watched on BNET. GameSpot videogame reviews.

Access to content that CBS didn’t already have, that are additive–both in their own right online, with the margins that the CNET business is used to, and where we’re getting just stronger and stronger from a margin perspective–and potential content that can also be applied to our [local TV stations owned by CBS], our affiliates, our broadcast news, as well as the radio. So that’s the side of our business that is $600 million revenue and $50 million-plus profit on the bottom line.

The other side of the Web, the side that is most thought of by many journalists, is the threat of an IP-deliverer of video. And how you turn that threat into an opportunity.

And so, from that perspective, as  you know, we didn’t go ahead and say, “Okay, we’re going to lock down and stream, with all of our other peers in broadcast, and come up with the same rules, and embed and right-click this and go away.” I’ve never had a beef with Hulu. Hulu’s always worked as a great service. That’s part of the problem.

As a network, we need to make sure that our content is being seen where the dollars matter. And right now that’s on air. Opportunities like TV Everywhere–we’re not putting all of our eggs in that basket, though we are big advocates of it–are ones where you can actually take and expand and extend the television market online, so it doesn’t matter what screen you watch “CSI” on; what matters is that you watched it, it counts and you saw the ads.

But until that happens, it’s crazy to just stream the shows for zero economics. When in fact you can make a lot more money doing things that are additive and complementary to the rest of the CBS line. That’s where CBS interactive comes in now.

Kafka: But TV viewers are showing an increasing interest in watching their programs on the Web, whether from legal services like the Web or illegal torrents and pirate sites. Don’t you need to reach them where they are?

Smith:

Now, if you really look at those numbers, what they’ll say is [online and offline video are] both growing, right? We’re having the best year ever as America’s largest broadcast network, and I think that 99.9 percent of that–this is the quote I’ve never been able to get in there–is that’s [because] of the great content that we have. There’s some infinitesimal basis point that’s relevant [to CBS ratings because] we are making sure that when people watch it, they’re more inclined to watch it on television. For now.

Once that solution moves, once those economics move–whether that’s more ads, [higher] CPMs, more ad buyers….You and I can say all day long, “We’re sold out on Web video. That’s going really well. It’s sold out.” Well, no kidding, it’s sold out. It’s a $700 million market. The television market is $120 billion. And of that, $700 million, half of those [ad buyers] are spending  90 percent of their time doing Google keywords, not buying online video.

The key is, how do you turn television buyers into video buyers? And that’s where a solution like TV Everywhere comes into play.

And by the way, looking at [Hulu CEO Jason] Kilar’s comments the other day, in Colorado [at an industry convention], he sees that too. He’s more sophisticated on this stuff than most anybody. From the perspective of, he understands that’s where the big dollars are. And so he probably went at it as, “I’m going to aggregate all the people first, so hopefully things like TV everywhere come to us.” From our perspective at CBS, we’ve got to go to them.

I don’t hate Hulu. Hulu’s world-class video viewing. What I don’t understand is, why license all that content to something that works that well, that seamlessly, yet–without the economic model around it?

Things should be better for them, too, says Publicis, one of the biggest advertising companies in the world. The French holding company, which announced its results today, says things bottomed out this summer, and that “the advertising market is starting its recovery which will be slow and progressive.”

For a slightly less stilted version of that statement, see Publicis boss Maurice Levy: “The recovery will be slow, but all the signs we have are going in the right direction.”

As always with these stories, context is key: For now, “recovery”  generally means “less bad.” As in this case: Publicis says organic growth–the company’s performance after you strip out acquisitions and currency effects–declined 7.4 percent in the last quarter, which isn’t exactly sizzling. But it’s better than the 8.4 percent decline it notched in the previous quarter.

Tough times have forced many papers to rethink their circulation strategies. An obvious conclusion: Much of the money publishers were spending to print and deliver dead trees has gone to waste. New strategy: Print fewer copies, and charge more for the ones you do sell.

That’s a tactic, not a strategy, but in the near-term it might work.

In its last quarter, for instance, the New York Times (NYT),  saw its daily circulation drop by more than seven percent, but saw circulation revenue jump 6.7 percent, due to price increases. Last spring a single copy of the Times at a newsstand jumped from $1.50 to $2.00, and a Sunday Times now costs a staggering $6. But people are buying them.

Meanwhile, News Corp. (NWS), which owns The Wall Street Journal as well as this Web site, has been steadily increasing the WSJ price. And circulation revenue is up at the McClatchy (MNI) and Media General (MEG) chains.

Again, the industry can’t shrink its way to recovery. There are fewer people paying for news–on or offline–than there have been in decades, and there’s no way to paint this as a positive. But the people who still subscribe to papers value them, and it would be foolish not to capitalize on that. Editor & Publisher:

There are several reasons as to why circulation keeps dropping, aside from former readers who have kicked the print edition to the curb. Publishers have been purposely pulling back on certain types of circulation, including hotel, employee and third-party sponsored copies. No longer are they distributing newspapers to the outer reaches of the core market. The cost of delivery and the cost of materials have forced publishers to scale back.

Another shift has occurred: volume has taken a back seat to dollars.

Several major newspapers across the country have aggressively hiked prices of single-copy and home-delivered papers in search of circulation revenue and a renewed focus on loyal readers. Circulation is guaranteed to go down as prices go up, but publishers have opted to wring more revenue from readers as advertisers keep their coffers closed.