The breakdown: The company did well overseas, where revenue jumped 17.8 percent after factoring out currency effects, and poorly in the U.S., where sales dropped by 7.4 percent. Digital, which grew by 11.5 percent (excluding FOREX), now makes up 21.4 percent of Warner’s (WMG) revenue.

Operating income dropped by 18 percent, to $54 million, but all of that decline stems from the severance charges. Factor those out and operating income would be up slightly to $68 million.

For years, the music industry has watched music sales drop while music publishing–money generated by the underlying compositions of songs–has increased. But this time around that’s not the case. Warner says recorded music sales were up 3.7 percent (net of currency changes) and that music publishing revenue was up 11.7 percent.

But all of the publishing increase stems from a one-time gain of $25 million “from an agreement reached by the U.S. recorded music and music publishing industries, which will result in the payment of mechanical royalties accrued in prior years by record companies.”

For the record, the deal theoretically values Imeem at something like $8 million, but most of that comes in the form of accounts receivable and debt obligations, and isn’t relevant to MySpace, which won’t be dealing with that stuff. And it’s not relevant to investors like Sequoia and Warner Music Group (WMG), which pumped at least $25 million into the venture.

In retrospect, Warner’s move to write off all of its Imeem investment in May was 100 percent accurate.

In September, I visited Caldwell in his San Francisco office. He looked like a guy who has had a very hard year, but he was confident that the company had gotten through the worst of it. If Imeem executed on plan, he argued, it would be able to survive. It wouldn’t be a home run, but it could at least sustain itself–no mean feat for a digital music start-up.

So what happened? “Things can change very quickly,” a person familiar with the company’s story told me yesterday. The short version of the story is that Imeem quickly and unexpectedly ran out of cash. Here’s the longer version of that story, which I’ve pieced together from various sources:

• As Om Malik reported, the company was hit with a copyright lawsuit by music publisher Orchard Enterprises (ORCD). Fighting the suit or settling it would require significant resources.
• Efforts to raise another funding round fell flat. If you want, you can blame the fact that Sequoia declined to pour more money into the company, which acted as a blinking red warning light for other potential investors. Or you could point to the fact that Web music start-ups of all stripes have been flailing for a couple of years.
• Ad sales, which had been perking up throughout the year, fell short of Q4 targets.
• All of the above meant that Imeem was struggling to meet payroll and payments on its debt, which it racked up when it built out its own content-delivery network.

So in retrospect, it’s easy to see why the company sold: It had no choice. And it’s sort of easy to see why News Corp.’s (NWS) MySpace bought Imeem: It’s hard to pay less for talent.

But oddly, the deal is the only one of its kind. While the big music labels have played footsie with Hulu in the past, they have yet to actually move any of their clips there.

That could still happen one day, and the site hints that you may see more clips coming down the road. But Hulu is less valuable for the labels than it could have been a year ago: Since then, three of the big four have struck deals that give them much more incentive to show their stuff on Google’s (GOOG) YouTube, the world’s biggest video site.

Vivendi’s Universal Music and Sony (SNE) have a deal that locks up their stuff exclusively on Vevo, a sort of “Hulu for music videos” that will be powered by YouTube. And Warner Music Group (WMG) has convinced YouTube to give the label its own branded channel for its clips.

No word on financials for the Hulu deal, but I’d surprised if this generates much cash for EMI. Hulu’s core partners–News Corp.’s (NWS) Fox, GE’s (GE) NBC Universal and Disney’s (DIS) ABC–have deals that let them keep 70 percent of any ad revenue their stuff generates on the site. But other partners get closer to 50 percent.

In other Norah news, my soon-to-be sort-of neighbor is having construction problems. Here she is taking on one of the great Wilco songs:

That’s the obvious question in light of news that both Terra Firma, the private equity group that bought EMI in 2007, and Citigroup, which funded most of the transaction, have written down most of their investments in the music company.

This isn’t a surprise–the move has been a long time coming–but it does open the door for Warner, which restructured its debt with an eye toward making such a deal earlier this year.

Pali Research’s Rich Greenfield thinks that Citi (C) will push to break up EMI and sell Warner (WMG) the record music group, which tends to lose money, and keep the music publishing business, which has been a reliable money maker, even during the industry’s 10-year freefall.

But at this point, I don’t know why Warner couldn’t try to swallow the whole thing. In the past, that deal would have been scuttled due to antitrust issues (and in fact, it was), but the music industry is a different beast right now–a sick beast–and I think regulators would be a lot more forgiving this time around.

[Image credit: beggs]

This one isn’t a total shock, as EMI and Grooveshark had supposedly been close to a deal prior to the lawsuit. And it wouldn’t be the first time that a label sued a Web company: See Warner Music Group (WMG) and Imeem, as well as Universal Music Group and News Corp.’s (NWS) MySpace, among others.

No details on the deal from EMI or Florida-based Grooveshark, which offers free streaming music, a la MySpace Music, Imeem, Spotify and others. Unlike those services, though, Grooveshark doesn’t appear to have licensing deals with three of the big four labels and plays their music anyway. But with the exception of the EMI suit, it has remained unmolested. Interesting.

For the record, here’s the release (Inside baseball note to Grooveshark guys: Please don’t attach press releases as PDF files. Really cumbersome. Thanks.):

Music streaming service Grooveshark signs deal with EMI Music and EMI Music Publishing
Gainesville, FL–Today, digital music service Grooveshark.com announced it has entered into agreements with major label EMI Music and EMI Music Publishing that will give Grooveshark users access to content from EMI’s roster of current and legendary catalog artists and EMI Music Publishing’s songwriters.

Grooveshark offers music fans the ability to stream songs for no fee from a vast catalog of music. Fans can enjoy Grooveshark’s music without having to download client software or register. The basic service is free to fans and supported by visual advertising. Fans who opt for a $3 per month premium service can enjoy unlimited ad-free streaming music. The site was recently named the best way to listen to music on the web by Rolling Stone, and just surpassed one million registered users.

“EMI Music and EMI Music Publishing have collaborated with us to create a mutually sustainable deal which represents the future of digital music,” says Grooveshark CEO Sam Tarantino. “We will continue to deliver the best music service on the Internet to our users, and we will expand our capacity to strengthen fan-to-artist connections through our technology.”

“We think services like Grooveshark offer great music discovery options for fans,” said Mark Piibe, EMI Music’s Global Head of Digital Business Development. ”In turn, Grooveshark offers a new revenue stream for our artists and will help us learn more about how we can better connect different types of fans with artists.”

Now, three years after Google (GOOG) plunked down $1.6 billion for the video site, it seems to have figured out an approach that works for at least some big players: Hand over a chunk of the site to content creators, who get to control it, sell ads on it, program it with their stuff and share some of the ad dollars.

It’s a pretty straightforward compromise: YouTube gets some of the ad dollars that “premium” content–stuff you’d see on a TV screen, basically–can generate; content creators get access to the the gazillion eyeballs that the world’s biggest video site attracts. Examples: See the pacts that Sony (SNE), Disney (DIS), Time Warner’s (TWX) Turner, Warner Music Group (WMG) and Universal Music have hammered out in recent months.

And that sounds like the deal that YouTube and Britain’s Channel 4 have reached. Telegraph:

YouTube and Channel 4 have been in talks for at least the last six months and a contract is expected to be signed imminently. The Telegraph understands that Channel 4 has negotiated the right to sell its own advertising around its content on YouTube and share the revenue with the Google-owned site.

A senior television source close to Channel 4 said: “It was key for Channel 4 to be able to sell the advertising around its own inventory so it could extract maximum value from the deal and retain commercial control over its own property.

“When the Channel 4 content formally appears on YouTube, it will be branded exactly the same way as it is on the Channel 4 website. It will be a fully Channel 4 branded space and look as if someone has picked up 4 on Demand (Channel 4’s online catch up service) and put it on YouTube.”

…The partnership will be the first formal arrangement YouTube has agreed with a British broadcaster in which the majority of its content will be shown in full on the video-sharing site.

No comment from YouTube. If the report doesn’t pan out, I’m assuming it won’t have any impact on anyone reading this in the U.S.: The Web is worldwide, but these content deals tend to be specific to various territories, which means you won’t be able to watch British programming from the States. Fair enough: My non-U.S. readers always gripe about not being able to watch Hulu clips.

Warner (WMG) is handing those duties over to Outrigger Media, a New York-based rep firm that specializes in Web media (Outrigger’s preferred description: “Internet video sales and marketing firm”), the companies announced today; oddly, Warner’s release goes on and on without even once mentioning Google (GOOG) or YouTube. Go figure.

I’ll admit that I hadn’t heard of Outrigger before this morning, but I had heard of its CEO, Mike Henry, an ad sales veteran who was previously running ad sales for Veoh, one of the many video sites that aimed to become the next YouTube in the past few years. Turns out, Henry is still running ad sales for Veoh–the company has outsourced its ad sales business to Outrigger.

Warner’s strategy is different from the one rival Universal Music is taking with Vevo, the “Hulu for music videos” joint venture it launched with Sony (SNE), with help from YouTube. Vevo is creating its own in-house salesforce, to be led by Nokia (NOK) and and Viacom (VIA) vet David Kohl.

I can understand Warner’s reluctance to build a salesforce of its own–if you really want to do this stuff right, you’re looking at 20 or 30 people–but it seems that long term, if the labels have a future, it’s going to be primarily as a sales and marketing force, and you’d want to make a bet on that now. It will be interesting to see how this plays out.

That’s 10 billion views, and that’s just counting Web surfers from the U.S. Factor in international visitors and…it would be a lot bigger.

The rest of the rankings look about the same as they as they always do–puny compared to Google’s (GOOG) status. That is, if you add up the next nine biggest sites, they won’t come close to matching YouTube’s share. But for the record, Hulu gained share but lost a position to Fox Interactive Media/MySpace, its corporate cousin from News Corp (NWS). And Time Warner’s (TWX) AOL replaced Disney’s (DIS) ABC at the bottom of the rankings. Click table to enlarge:

Yet another reason it’s amazing that it took Warner Music Group nine months to hammer out a deal to get its video back on YouTube–and bear in mind that they’re not there yet. If you’re in the music video business and you pull your videos off the world’s biggest video site, you had better have a very good reason for doing so.

In other shocking news: This movie is 12 years old. That’s older than Google!

Last December, talks between Warner and YouTube to renew a licensing deal broke down, and Warner’s videos disappeared from the world’s largest video site. Now, as Advertising Age has reported, an agreement is in the works that will bring Green Day, Madonna and their label-mates back to the site.

What hasn’t been reported, so far: The deal terms themselves. Neither company is talking, but sources familiar with the negotiations tell me the new pact will be similar to the one Google’s (GOOG) video unit struck earlier this year with Universal Music Group.

That deal created Vevo, a sort of “Hulu for music videos,” owned by Universal and Sony (SNE). So think of Warner’s deal as a “son of Vevo.”

The big idea is the same: Try to create more value for videos by limiting their distribution and creating a more ad-friendly atmosphere around them, and share ad revenue between YouTube and the videos’ owner. The big points:

• Unlike Vevo, Warner and YouTube won’t be creating a separate site for Warner videos, and Warner won’t be creating a separate company dedicated to its videos. Instead, YouTube will help Warner create a “premium advertising platform” for its videos within YouTube.
• Warner will take primary responsibility for selling its videos, and YouTube will receive a cut of the revenue.
• Warner will no longer receive a licensing fee each time one of its videos is played.

I gather that a lot of this is still being hashed out, and some of this will evolve even after the deal is inked. For instance, Warner needs to figure out how it’s going to sell advertising for its clips, since it doesn’t have its own sales force. Timing is also up in the air: Even after the two sides formally announce the pact, users shouldn’t expect to see Warner videos instantly reappearing on YouTube; it may be that they only get rolled out as the new ad platform is built.

Then there’s the ad platform itself: I haven’t been able to get a concrete definition of what this is supposed to look like, but for now, I’m imagining something like the “channels” YouTube has made for partners like ESPN, except they’d be made on an artist-by-artist basis.

All in all, this sounds like a fair deal. Warner loses a guaranteed revenue stream, but if its contention about the value of its videos is correct, it will make even more than it did under the old arrangement. Meanwhile, YouTube gets to hang onto “premium” inventory without being locked into the kind of  pay-per-play arrangement that helped drive the site’s expenses sky-high.

The potential downside for YouTube: If this works–or if the Vevo deal works–it will have to create similar packages/portals/platforms to retain or attract other “premium” content suppliers, like, say Hollywood studios. But given that the site has had limited success getting those guys on board so far, that’s not the worst fate in the world.

In the meantime, even though Green Day is Warner act, you can still find plenty of its clips on YouTube–it’s just that most of them are odds and ends like this grainy concert video:

Parsons will be a part-time adviser says the New York Times and will keep his current job as Citigroup (C) chairman as well. Providence’s media bets include MGM and Univision, which haven’t worked out, and Hulu, which has.

Providence and Parsons have worked together at least once before: In 2004, Parsons sold Warner Music Group (WMG) to a consortium that included Providence, Thomas H. Lee Partners and Edgar Bronfman Jr.

Perhaps Providence will tap Parsons’s knowledge of his former employer for another deal: Time Warner executives keep murmuring about the need for magazine publisher Time Inc. to shed some of the 115 titles it operates.

That’s part of the pitch that Evercore Partners has been making to investors on behalf of McGraw-Hill (MHP), which wants to dump BusinessWeek.

The New York Times’s Stephanie Clifford gott her hands on the offering memo Evercore has been circulating to potential bidders, who are supposed to submit offers by today. Reportedly in the mix: Bloomberg; ZelnickMedia; New York Magazine owner Bruce Wasserstein; OpenGate Capital, which bought TV Guide last year for $1 plus debt; and Platinum Equity, which is bidding for the New York Times’s (NYT) Boston Globe.

In a story published yesterday, Clifford reviewed the magazine’s financials, which are miserable. Ditto for the magazine’s Web site. Today she points out Evercore’s plan to entice buyers: A ready-made layoff plan that would lop off 20 percent of the magazine’s staff.

The Evercore memo says the layoffs are actually “in process,” an assertion that seems to surprise BusinessWeek’s staff, which has seen no sign of layoffs. So best to interpret these numbers as suggestions, not plans. That said, here are Evercore’s suggestions:

In editorial, 55 of 217 positions are supposed to be eliminated. Of sales, 9 of 69. Of marketing, 6 of 26. Of technology, 8 of 33. Of circulation, just one of 19. And in the “other” category, 6 of 57. That’s a total of 85 eliminations among 421 jobs – about 20 percent – leaving 336 BusinessWeek employees.

“BusinessWeek will establish a leaner, entrepreneurial staff without affecting the brand, positioning of the franchise or revenue outlook. The eliminations of editorial staff are primarily in editorial support operations (makeup and copy desk), but also include a reduction in the number of journalists to reflect the smaller folio size of the publication. The positions eliminated in sales are primarily for sales support, but also include some consolidation of integrated sales account managers. The remaining positions eliminated are in other business support functions.”

A logical question: If these cuts are so easy to make, why hasn’t McGraw-Hill made them? I know that this strategy isn’t uncommon in auctions: Many moons ago, Time Warner (TWX) held off making cuts at its music unit so that a new buyer could do it itself, and that’s exactly what Edgar Bronfman Jr. and crew did once they got their hands on Warner Music Group (WMG). But the practice still baffles me. Anyone?

Google has reached a settlement with a British licensing group in a dispute over royalty payments, which means that YouTube’s U.K. outpost will begin showing licensed music videos again. The clips disappeared five months ago when YouTube and PRS for Music, the U.K. body that collects money on behalf of songwriters, couldn’t come to terms.

Google (GOOG) executives wouldn’t disclose how much they’re paying songwriters for the rights to play videos that feature their songs, but said they would be cutting PRS for Music a single check that covers the length of the deal. The new pact will extend through June 2012 and will retroactively stretch back to the beginning of this year.

The deal may provide a blueprint for resolving a similar dispute between the video site and a German rights society. But I’m not sure it will do much for the one Google is still (still!) stuck in with Warner Music Group (WMG).

Meanwhile, this video doesn’t feature a British composer or performer and wasn’t shot in Britain. No connection at all, really. But if you like Lou Reed, louche ’70s fashion and/or awesome ’70s facial hair, you’re gonna like it.

But if you want to save money and time, you can head over to JamLegend, where you can play along with “Ticket to Ride” or any other song, for free.

What’s the catch? Well, there are a bunch: For instance, you need to own whatever song you want to play, and you’ll have to upload a copy of the tune (in MP3 form) to JamLegend, which will store up to five songs at a time.

And JamLegend is no Rock Band–instead of a high-end console game featuring “real” fake instruments and expensive animation, it’s a relatively crude Web game you play with a keyboard.

Oh. And the “play your own music” feature the company is promoting today could end very soon, maybe even today. The year-old start-up hasn’t run the idea by the big music labels–Warner Music Group (WMG), Sony (SNE), Universal Music Group and EMI–and odds are that at least one of them is going to growl about this.

If they do, says CEO Andrew Lee, he’ll back down fairly quickly. “The music industry has reached a point where they don’t always send out a cease & desist [letter] whenever anyone tries something,” he says. “But if they do send out a C&D we’ll definitely abide by it.”

But give Lee and his two-co-founders credit: This is a smart stunt that should get their year-old start-up some well-deserved attention. And it makes a fine point, too–there’s no reason you shouldn’t be able to play Rock Band, Guitar Hero, or any of the many knockoffs with music you own.

Especially in the form that Lee is doing it: While JamLegend offers a multiplayer game, the only way you can only play with your uploaded songs is by yourself. There’s no “sharing” going on here. And in the end, that’s really not going to be that much fun; the whole point of these games, as far as I can tell, is to play them, karaoke-style, with a bunch of your pals (drinking doesn’t hurt, either).

Lee acknowledges this and says he’d be happy to work out something with the labels that lets him expand the use of their music. That’s already happened, on an ad hoc basis: A handful of the 600 songs his game features come from little-known artists signed to Sony and Universal, whose promotional staffs have asked JamLegend to incorporate the tunes.

But Lee says that when he’s talked to the labels about wide-ranging pacts in the past, he’s been told he doesn’t have enough reach or money to cut a deal. He has about 800,000 unique monthly users, and the three-person company, sprung from Washington, DC-area incubator LaunchBox Digital, has raised about $500,000 in angel funding. Let’s see if his bid for attention changes that.

Meanwhile, if you haven’t seen what the Beatles edition of Rock Band looks like, take a gander here. Personally, I find these uncanny valley renderings unpleasant, but I’m probably not the target demo for this stuff anyway. And great songs are great songs, so maybe it will do as well as everyone hopes.

(Happy Birthday, Ben!)

The service took one step toward wider distribution today when Apple (AAPL) approved its iPhone app (for a glimpse of the app, see the video at the bottom of this post). But that won’t help U.S. users until the big music labels–Warner Music Group (WMG), Sony (SNE), EMI and Universal Music Group–agree to American distribution deals.

But before we get to that, let’s back up and explain what Spotify is: A streaming-music service that lets you listen to whatever you want whenever you want, as long as you have a Web connection. A free version comes with ads, and if you want to do away with those, you can pay for a subscription.

Does that sound familiar? It should. There are plenty of models like this available in the U.S. right now, from RealNetworks’s (RNWK) Rhapsody to MySpace Music, a joint venture owned by News Corp.’s (NWS) social network and the big labels. For various reasons, equivalent (and legal) models have been much harder to come by in Europe, which explains part of the appeal there. The other explanation is that Spotify works beautifully.

But don’t take my word for it. Ask Slate.com columnist Farhad Manjoo (“The best streaming music service in the world”). Or better yet, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg (“Spotify is so good”).

Meanwhile, investors–primarily European ones–have been throwing money at Spotify, and the big music labels’ international arms are enthusiastic partners (and equity shareholders). And the company’s boosters have been pointing to a U.S. launch as early as the fourth quarter of this year.

So let’s assume this happens. What then? The problem with the digital music business, as company after company has found out, is that it’s a miserable business:

• Selling music by the track is a low-margin affair that only works if you have enormous scale–Apple sells some two billion songs a year.
• It’s been nearly impossible to get more than a few hundred thousand people to pay a monthly fee for music–ask Rhapsody or Best Buy’s (BBY) Napster, which have been slogging away at this for years without gaining any traction.
• And it’s been impossible to support a free service with advertising while ponying up big licensing fees to the labels–ask Imeem, et al.

So why will Spotify be any different? Depends on whom you ask. Some figure that it has the best chance of working as a mobile service and that since phone users aren’t used to the idea of getting all the music they can eat on their phones for free, they’ll pay up if given the chance. Others think the big labels have gotten wiser and/or more benevolent about their licensing fees and are willing to wring less out of Spotify at the start in the hope that it will pay off down the road.

Still others just shrug and figure it will work out somehow because…well, one of these days, someone has to figure out how to make this work. “Everybody loves the product,” says an industry executive familiar with the company’s plans. “And there’s a hope that the business model is realistic.”

I have heard rumbling that not all of the big labels are equally enthusiastic about a U.S. licensing deal. It’s unclear whether that’s due to something specific about the U.S. market or to internecine squabbles at particular labels. But Spotify will need at least three of the big four to play along. And then we can see just how realistic the model really is.

Part of the magic trick will involve cutting costs. That’s hard to see play out in real time, except when we get flare-ups like YouTube’s fight with Warner Music Group (WMG) over new contract terms. The other part of the abracadabra–selling more ads on more videos, particularly “viral” hits–is easier to spot, particularly because YouTube keeps pointing it out.

For instance: Yesterday’s announcement that the site would start attaching ads to many more popular videos submitted by users and share the proceeds with the uploaders.

YouTube was typically vague about how the plan will work, but the most telling news is that it thinks it can increase the number of “partners” it shares ad revenue with from “thousands” to “tens of thousands.”

Translation: All those skateboarding dog videos you make fun of? We’re going to turn them into money machines. Just watch!

I’m going to make an educated guess and posit that for all the effort YouTube has made  to “monetize”–I hate that word, but what can you do?–its gazillions of videos, its most important revenue generator is still its homepage. YouTube’s competitors think a one-day “takeover” there may cost an advertiser as much as $500,000.

There’s not a whole lot of upside left for YouTube in the homepage, though. It’s the gateway to the world’s biggest video site, and the second-biggest search engine, and you either want to advertise on it or you don’t.

But the rest of site remains a big opportunity. YouTube can keep chasing splashy “premium content” deals like the ones it has struck with Sony (SNE), Disney (DIS) and Time Warner (TWX). And at the same time, it can try selling more of the “long tail”–basically, everything that isn’t “premium.”

YouTube’s long-tail efforts sometimes get ignored, especially when the site is compared to Hulu and its array of TV shows and movies. But YouTube executives have insisted for a while that long-tail videos will play a big role in the site’s future, and the new move underscores that.

“I think they are working [the long tail] hard but are not articulating it well,” the head of a competing Web video company told me earlier this month. “It may be because they are worried about how advertisers and agencies will view them, but it may also be that they are not revealing it all until it’s farther along.” Yesterday, YouTube gave us another peek.